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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-4075 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL DANTIONE DOTSON, 
                                            Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00435-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe  
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: February 05, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Michael Dantione Dotson appeals the judgment of the District Court sentencing 
him to 240 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of crack 
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cocaine.  His counsel filed a motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders 
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no non-frivolous issues for 
appeal.  We will affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
I. 
 Dotson participated in a crack cocaine trafficking organization that operated from 
2004 until 2009 in the City of Lancaster and Columbia Borough, Pennsylvania.  He 
assisted Kevin Leon Major—the ringleader of the organization—by taking telephone 
orders for crack cocaine, and filling those orders himself or having other members of the 
organization fill the orders, and eventually became equal partners with Major.  After 
Major went to jail in February 2009, Dotson, along with several codefendants, assumed 
control of the day-to-day operations of the organization.  He was responsible for the 
distribution of at least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. 
 Dotson entered an open guilty plea on September 27, 2010 to one count of 
conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and one count of distributing 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(b), § 841(a)(1) and § 841(B)(1)(C).  Prior to 
the guilty plea, the government filed a prior felony information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 
851 setting forth Dotson’s two prior convictions, both in the Lancaster County Court of 
Common Pleas: (1) a 1998 conviction for conspiracy and possession of crack cocaine 
with intent to deliver, for which Dotson received a sentence of time served to 23 months’ 
imprisonment; and (2) a 2001 conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to 
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deliver, for which he received a sentence of 53 days to 23 months’ imprisonment.  Dotson 
spent considerably less than a year in prison on each of these prior convictions.  Although 
there was no plea agreement in this case, it was agreed that at the time of sentencing, the 
government would withdraw one of the convictions from the information to reduce 
Dotson’s sentencing exposure from a mandatory life sentence to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment.   
 At the sentencing hearing, Dotson did not object to the presentence report, did not 
deny that he had been convicted twice in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 
for dealing crack cocaine, and did not deny that the amount of crack cocaine involved in 
the drug conspiracy before us triggered a statutory mandatory minimum ten-year sentence 
pursuant to  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).  Dotson, however, instructed his counsel to 
argue that his prior drug convictions did not qualify as “felony drug offenses” under 21 
U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A), which would operate to enhance his mandatory minimum sentence, 
because (1) the convictions were more than ten years old at the time of the sentencing 
hearing, and (2) he served a term of less than a year on each of those convictions.  
Following the government’s withdrawal of Dotson’s 1998 conviction from the prior 
felony information, the District Court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment.  He 
timely appealed. 
II. 
 Under Anders v. California, if appellate counsel “finds his case to be wholly 
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frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and 
request permission to withdraw.  That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief 
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  386 U.S. 738, 
744 (1967).  “The Court’s inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold: 
(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an 
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  With respect to the first requirement: 
The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief are (1) to satisfy the 
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of 
appealable issues, and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous.  Counsel 
need not raise and reject every possible claim. However, at a minimum, he 
or she must meet the “conscientious examination” standard . . . .  
 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  When reviewing the record for non-frivolous issues, we 
generally confine our scrutiny to those portions of the record identified by an adequate 
Anders brief, and the appellant’s pro se filings.   
 We conclude that counsel has satisfied his obligation to conduct a “conscientious 
examination” of the case.  Likewise, our independent analysis of the record reveals no 
error in the guilty plea itself or in the sentence.  With reference to the guilty plea, the 
District Court ensured that it was knowing and voluntary, and thoroughly complied with 
the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 during the plea colloquy.  As 
for the sentence, Dotson did not dispute that he was subject to the ten-year mandatory 
minimum on the conspiracy count to which he pled guilty.  Moreover, he did not dispute 
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that he had been convicted of distributing crack cocaine in 2001, an offense carrying a 
maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment.  35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(f)(1.1).     
 The specific argument raised in Dotson’s pro se appellate brief is plainly without 
merit.  Dotson contends that because his 2001 drug conviction
1
 was more than ten years 
old at the time of sentencing and resulted in his imprisonment for a term of less than one 
year, it could not qualify as a “felony drug offense” that would operate to double his 
mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).  If, however, as here, a violation 
of section 841(a) involves 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, and the person commits 
the violation “after a prior felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years . . . .” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(A).    21 U.S.C. § 802(44) defines a “felony drug offense” as “an offense that 
is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States 
or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic 
drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.”  The plain 
language of the statute does not impose a time limitation on the prior felony or felonies 
that would trigger an enhanced mandatory minimum. See United States v. Hudacek, 24 
F.3d 143, 146 (11th Cir. 1994).  Moreover, to qualify as a “felony drug offense,” it is not 
necessary that the defendant actually serve, or even be sentenced to, a term of 
                                                 
1
 Dotson states incorrectly that the government relied on his 1998 crack cocaine 
conviction to establish a prior felony drug offense.  The government dismissed this 
conviction in its amended prior felony information, and relied instead on the 2001 
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imprisonment of more than one year.  Rather, the predicate drug offense need only be 
punishable by more than a year of imprisonment.  Dotson was convicted in 2001 of 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, which carries a maximum penalty of up to 
ten years in prison.  He was, therefore, subject to the sentence enhancement provision of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(b).   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence and grant 
counsel’s motion to withdraw.  We also find, pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(b), 
that the issues presented in this appeal lack legal merit for the purposes of counsel filing a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
conviction.  Because both offenses are more than ten years old and resulted in his 
imprisonment for less than a year, Dotson’s argument is applicable to either conviction.   
